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Abstract 
In this paper we study relevance relations in the context of propositional logical theories and 
subject matters or topics of interest, which we take to be sets of atomic propositions. In particular, 
we are interested in answering questions like the following: when is a sentence (or theory) 
relevant to a subject matter, or, when is a topic relevant to another topic or sentence given some 
background theory? Relevance is studied from a subjective or epistemic point of view, that is, we 
try to capture relevance relations from an agent’s point of view relative to his or her deductive 
capabilities. For this purpose, we start out with the definition of regular belief, which covers a wide 
range of belief modeis, from the very weak to those closed under classical logical implication. 
In the paper, we consider one example from each of the extremes, which are called explicit and 
implicit belief, respectively. We define a notion of prime implicates which applies to all models 
of regular belief and which has its usual meaning under implicit belief. Prime implicates turn out 
to be the right primitive from which all definitions of relevance are derived. Among the main 
technical contributions is a detailed comparison between relevance under implicit belief and three 
other approaches in the literature. This investigation reveals that all four share a lot of common 
ground even though some have very different starting points. We also study the complexity of 
determining relevance relations for implicit as well as explicit belief. While intractability obtains 
often, but not always, for implicit belief, the analogous problems for explicit belief are almost 
always tractable. @ 1997 Elsevier Science B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we study relevance relations in the context of propositional logical 
theories and subject matters or topics of interest. In particular, we are interested in 
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answering questions like the following: when is a sentence (or theory) relevant to a 
subject matter, or, when is a topic relevant to another topic or sentence given some 
background theory? We believe that precise answers to such questions are needed if one 
is interested in more powerful query facilities for knowledge bases which allow requests 
like “tell me all you know about x”. In the database community, issues such as these 
have been of interest for some time (see, for example, [ 51) . 
There is little consensus about what constitutes a subject matter and it is probably fair 
to say that there is no one right answer. In formal approaches which make use of subject 
matters either implicitly or explicitly, these are sometimes sentences (for example, 
[ 9,341) and at other times sets of predicates, ground facts, or atomic propositions as in 
[ 3,7,8,33]. For example, in the case of de Kleer’s ATMS [ 81, the topic of interest can 
be identified with the set of assumptions. Of course, the underlying language already 
limits what can plausibly be called a subject matter. In this paper we are dealing with 
a propositional language and a subject matter is taken to be simply a set of atomic 
propositions. We will see that interesting issues arise even under these restrictions. 
Perhaps the most distinctive feature that sets this work apart from other approaches 
to relevance is the subjective point of view. In particular, we try to capture relevance 
relations relative to the deductive capabilities of an agent. For example, two agents who 
are given the same information may very well differ in their opinion about whether 
p is relevant to q. Even the same agent may at first miss a connection between the 
two, which may be discovered upon further reflection. For instance, a student solving a 
geometry problem involving a right-angled rectangle may not see the connection to the 
Pythagorean Theorem. 
Before getting into details about the approach, let us consider some examples that 
illustrate some of the relevance relations we want to capture in a propositional setting. 
The following example sentences are partly adapted from [ 71. 
Al = {(rain > wet), (sprinkler-on > wet)} 
42 = {(rain > wet), (wet > slippery)} 
A3 = {(rain > umbrella), (Train > umbrella)} 
Here rain, wet, sprinkler-on, slippery, and umbrella stand for the propositions 
“it ruins”, “the ground is wet”, and “the sprinkler is on”, “the ground is slippery”, 
and “I carry an umbrella”, respectively. Probably even the weakest reasoner would 
conclude that Al tells us something relevant about the proposition rain (as well as 
sprinkler-on and wet). On the other hand, Al seems irrelevant to anything else like 
Jack-is-happy. In the case of A3 a shallow reasoner may think it tell us something 
about rain, whereas a little more though reveals that it is in fact irrelevant to rain, 
since Al is logically equivalent to umbrella. 
It also makes sense to talk about relevance between propositions relative to a back- 
ground theory. For example, given Al, rain should count as relevant to wet since the 
latter is true whenever the former is. On the other hand, there really is no connection 
between rain and sprinkler-on, since they are either forced to both be false by some 
other condition (the ground is not wet) or their truth values can vary independently 
of each other. Therefore, rain and sprinkler-on are not relevant to each other given 
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Al. In A2, a very weak reasoner who only looks at the clauses individually does not 
detect that there is a connection between rain and slippery. Relevance between the 
two is only detected after applying modus ponens to the two clauses. Similarly, a weak 
reasoner would claim that rain and umbrella are relevant to each other given As, 
whereas a moment’s thought tells us that they are not. 
Our goal is to specify relevance relations of this kind that are applicable to a wide 
class of reasoners. For that it is useful to start with a uniform framework for modeling an 
agent’s deductive capabilities. We have chosen modal epistemic logic for this purpose, 
since it has a very simple formulation and gives us all the flexibility we need. For 
example, we start out with a belief logic where an epistemic state (the sentences 
believed by the agent) can be any set. We then define a class of regular belief models 
by postulating certain valid sentences. While imposing some restrictions on the epistemic 
states, they still allow for a wide range of belief models, from the very weak to those 
closed under classical logical implication. In the paper, we consider one example from 
each of the extremes, which are called expEicit and implicit belief, respectively. ’ Since 
we do not need nested belief for our purposes, we only consider nonnested beliefs 
throughout the paper. We then define a notion of prime implicates which applies to all 
models of regular belief and which has its usual meaning under implicit belief. Prime 
implicates turn out to be the right primitive from which all definitions of relevance 
are derived. Among the main technical contributions is a detailed comparison between 
relevance under implicit belief and three other approaches in the literature ( [ 16,341, 
[ 71, and [ 331). Our investigation reveals that all four share a lot of common ground 
even though some have very different starting points. We also study the complexity of 
determining relevance relations for implicit as well as explicit belief. While intractability 
obtains often, but not always, for implicit belief, the analogous problems for explicit 
belief are almost always tractable. 
This paper has grown out of previous work, most notably [25], which contains 
some of the results concerning the comparison with [ 7,331. In [ 251, we only deal with 
implicit belief and define relevance in terms of a logic of only-knowing-about [ 221, from 
which formulations involving prime implicates are derived. By using prime implicates 
directly as the foundation of relevance the framework has become much simpler and 
also led to the generalization in terms of regular belief. 
The work perhaps most closely related to our own is [ 7,16,33,34], and we will have 
a lot more to say about the connection later on. One of our definitions also draws heavily 
on ideas underlying an ATMS [ 8,29,36], which lies also at the heart of [ 16,341. More 
generally, our account of relevance emphasizes logical content rather than syntactic form. 
In this respect, it is more in the tradition of work in philosophy such as [ 151, which 
in turn was inspired by earlier work on relevance from the point of view of probability 
theory [4,20]. In contrast, a lot of recent work in AI focuses on relevance in connection 
with deriving answers to queries from a knowledge base, which has a distinct syntactic 
flavor, that is, a different formulation of the same content may lead to different relevance 
relations (see, for example, [ 30,3 1,381) . These approaches are also connected to work 
in databases such as [ 2, 12,321. 
’ The terms explicit and implicit belief were first introduced by Levesque I27 1. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the 
class of regular belief models and a notion of prime implicates applicable to all forms of 
this type of belief. As a special case of regular belief we introduce implicit belief, which 
has a classical possible-world model. In Section 3 we discuss our various definitions of 
relevance for regular belief using implicit belief as a running example. In Section 4 we 
focus on connections between relevance under implicit belief and work in the literature 
and computational aspects. Section 5 discusses relevance under explicit belief, which 
is based on a three-valued extension of possible-world semantics. The paper ends with 
concluding remarks. 
2. Regular belief 
In this section we define the class of regular belief models, which we will use later 
on to define various notions of relevance. 
Syntax. The primitives of the language consist of a finite set of atomic propositions (or 
atoms), the connectives V, A, 1, and the modal operator B. Sentences are formed in the 
usual way from these primitives except that we restrict ourselves to sentences without 
nested modal operators. 2 
Notation and some terminology. As usual, Eiterals are either atoms or negated atoms 
and clauses are sets of literals, understood disjunctively. A clause is called trivial if it 
contains an atom and its negation, that is, if it is a tautology. An atom is also called a 
positive literal and a negative literal is a negated atom. %p stands for both the positive 
and negative literal mentioning the atom p. Given an atomic proposition p and and a 
sentence or set of sentences A, we say that A mentions p just in case either p or up 
occurs in A. Given a finite set of sentences A, we often use A within a sentence and mean 
by it the conjunction of sentences contained in A, which we sometimes explicitly write as 
A,,,, y. If A is empty, the corresponding sentence is an arbitrary tautology. A sentence is 
called objective if it does not contain any modal operators. A subject matter T is a set of 
atoms. Given a sentence or set of sentences A, %-A = {p 1 p is an atom mentioned in A}. 
Finally, singleton subject matters {p} are generally written as p. 
Semantics. As usual, objective sentences are interpreted with respect to valuations W, 
which we take to be a subset of the atomic propositions. Intuitively, p E w means 
that p is true at w. Belief is interpreted with respect to an epistemic state e, which is 
simply a subset of the objective sentences. Naturally, CY E e means that (Y is believed 
at e. 
The semantics of arbitrary sentences given by this generic belief model can then be 
stated as follows. Let w be a valuation and e an epistemic state. 
2 We will freely use the connectives > and E, which should be understood as syntactic abbreviations of the 
usual kind. 
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e,wkP w PEW 
e,w/=-a - e,w#a 
e,w+crVp W e,w+aore,wb/? 
e,wkaA/? _ e,wk=ande,wb/? 
e,w +Ba _ aEe 
If (Y is objective, we sometimes write w b (Y instead of e, w k (Y. Also, if A is a set 
of sentences, e, w k A means for all 8 E A, e, w k 6. 
Note that so far we have not imposed any constraints at all on belief. Once we settle 
on a particular set of epistemic states 23, we obtain a particular belief model, which we 
identify with t3. 
Let B be a set of epistemic states. Given a set of sentences A and a sentence a, (Y 
is a logical consequence relative to B (written A ba a) iff for all valuations w and all 
e E B, if e, w k A, then e, w k (Y. (Y is said to be a-valid ( bB cu) iff {} k=a (Y. If the 
context is clear or if we do not care about the particular model of belief, we will write 
A ‘F a and /= cz instead of A +=a a and ka (Y, respectively. 
This way of defining belief, while perhaps unusual, has the advantage of giving us 
a framework which encompasses every possible belief model and, in particular, the 
following large class of models for which the notions of relevance defined later in this 
section are applicable. 
Definition 1. A model of belief L? is called regular iff 
(1) If +Bcr>BPthen FLY>/?. 
(2) For all clauses c and c’, if + c then b Bc and if b c s c’ then + Bc z Bc'. 
(3) Conversion rules. 
(a) ~B(LYA(PAY))-B(((YA\)AY). 
~B((~V(pVy))-B((aVp)vr). 
(b) ~B(cun(pvr))-B((aAp)v(crr\r)). 
I= B(aV (PAY)) -B((aVP) A (a’.‘~)). 
(c) /= B$cuVp) E B(xA+). 
k B7(aAp) ES B(wv-$?). 
(d) + B~-mzBa. 
(4) i= B(cu Ap)= Ba A BP. 
( 1) requires that reasoning under regular belief must be deductive, that is, we rule 
out that the agent infers p from a without /I being a classical logical consequence. 
(2) states that, at the level of a single clause, regular belief allows classical logical 
reasoning. This requirement is included mainly for convenience, since it allows us to 
identify believed clauses with the set of literals they contain. 
(3) together with (2) has the effect that beliefs have equivalent normal form trans- 
formations. For most of the paper, we really only need the assumption that beliefs 
have an equivalent conjunctive normal form (CNF), since most of our definitions about 
relevance require clausal form. 
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(4) together with (3) allows us to identify the beliefs represented by an arbitrary set 
of sentences with the set of clauses that are believed. 
As an immediate consequence of the above definition we obtain the following 
lemma: 
Lemma 2. For every regular model of belief and every objective cy, 
(1) ~~iifS~Bcrand 
(2) k Ba = BcY*, where a* is (Y converted into conjunctive or disjunctive normal 
fOmZ. 
Proof. The proof of k Bcu 3 BCX* follows the same argument as the one for + (Y = (Y* 
in classical logic and is omitted here. 
To prove that b LY iff k Ba assume that b cr and let A LYE be a in CNF. Then k LY, 
and, by condition (2) of the definition of regular belief, k Ba;. Since this holds for 
every i, we get k A Bai. By condition (4) we obtain b A Bcri z B A ai and by (3) 
k B A LYE G Ba. Therefore b Ba. 
Conversely, let /= Ba and assume that # (Y. Let p be an objective sentence such 
that # p > cr. Such p obviously exists. From k Bcu we also obtain b BP 1 Ba, 
contradicting condition (1) of regular belief. Cl 
The reader should note that regular belief still allows for very weak models of be- 
lief. In particular, regular belief need not be closed under logical implication, that is, 
{Bp, B(p 3 q), TBq} may be satisfiable. In Section 5, we will discuss a model with 
exactly that property. Our definition of regular belief is quite similar to one proposed 
by Levesque [ 291. However, there are some differences. For example, Levesque re- 
quires Ba 3 B(a V p> to be valid, which is not needed for our purposes (with one 
exception). 
In classical logic, prime implicates are the smallest clauses which follow from a given 
theory. Among other things, they are at the heart of abductive reasoning tasks (see, for 
example, [ 29,361). In our investigations of relevance, they will play a central role as 
well. Hence our first task is to generalize the notion of prime implicates to regular 
belief. 
Definition 3. For a given regular model of belief B and a finite set of objective sentences 
A, a clause c is called a prime B-implicate of A iff 
(1) kBA>Bcand 
(2) for all clauses c’, if + Bc’ 3 Bc and # Bc > Bc’, then # BA > Bc’ and 
(3) c is nontrivial and 
(4) c mentions only atoms in A. 
Notation. Let P( 8, A) be the set of all prime B-implicates of A and P( B, A, n-) = 
{c E P(B, A) 1 c mentions p for some p E ST}. If the context is clear or if the model 
of belief is not important, we will often write P(A) and P( A, T) instead of P(B, A) 
and P( B, A, n-) , respectively. Similarly, we often write prime implicate instead of prime 
B-implicate. 
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We will see below that the definition reduces to the familiar one in case regular belief 
is closed under classical logical consequence (see Lemma 8). In that case, for example, 
conditions (1) and (2) say nothing more than c is a smallest clause that follows from 
A. In the literature prime implicates often include tautologies (unless they are subsumed 
by other prime implicates). We have excluded them here in condition (3) mainly for 
convenience. While it may seem that condition (4) follows from the others, as it in fact 
does if belief is closed under classical logical consequence, this is not true in general. 
To see why consider the set of epistemic states Bi, which consists of all sets of objective 
sentences closed under logical consequence. (See the end of this section for a semantic 
definition of Bi.) Assume the language has as atomic propositions p, q, and r. Given any 
e E Bi, let C, be the set of clauses contained in e, C,? = C, - {clause c ) b c E q}, and 
e-q be the least set of sentences containing CL4 and which is closed under conjunction 
and the conversion rules required by regular belief. Note that by this construction, e--Y 
does not believe q even if it believes p and (p > q) . Then define a belief model 
B* = Bi u {e-q 1 e E Bi}. (We leave it to the reader to verify that B* is regular.) 
In particular, if A = {p,p > q}, then ka* BA > B(q V r) yet neither BA > Bq nor 
BA > Br is valid in B*. It is then easy to see that (q V r) satisfies all requirements of 
being a prime B*-implicate of A except the fourth condition. 
A nice property of prime B-implicates is that they serve as a canonical representation 
of the sentences an agent believes. To prove this we need two preliminary results. 
Lemma 4. If A is jinite then P(A) is jinite. 
Proof. The lemma holds because the prime B-implicates of A mention only atoms in A 
and because clauses are viewed as sets of literals, hence eliminating multiple occurrences 
of the same literal. 0 
Lemma 5. Let A be a set of objective sentences and c a nontrivial clause mentioning 
only atoms from ?rA. If /= BA 3 Be, then c contains a prime implicate c* such that 
k Bc* > Bc. 
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the number of literals in c. If c = &p, then 
c E P(A), which follows from condition (2) of the definition of prime implicates. 
Assume the lemma holds for clauses with less than n literals. Let c have n literals. If 
c E P(A) then we are done. Otherwise, there is a c’ such that b Bc’ > Bc, # Bc > Bc’, 
and b BA > Bc’. It is easy to see that c’ s c. From i= Bc’ > Bc we obtain k c’ > c 
and, hence, c’ 2 c. Also, since # Bc > Bc’, we have c # c’. Therefore the induction 
hypothesis applies to c’, that is, c’ contains a prime implicate c* of A such that c* s c’ 
and Bc* > Bc’. Hence c* s c and k Bc* > Bc’. 0 
Theorem 6. For any regular belief model andjnite set of sentences A, k BA F BP(A). 
Proof. The only-if direction clearly follows from the definition of prime B-implicates, 
that is, + BA > Bc for all c E P(A) and k &,(A) Bc E BP(A). Conversely, let 
LY E A. Since belief is regular, we have b Ba E BAai, where the ai are clauses. We 
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also have + B A q = A Bq for the same reason. For any such ai, if + ai, then + Bcq 
by the definition of regular belief and, hence, k BP(A) > Bai. Otherwise, by the 
previous lemma, there is a c E P(A) such that k Bc > Bai. Hence k BP(A) > Bai 
for all i and thus + BP(A) > Ba. Since this is true for all cy E A, we obtain 
I= B’I’( A) > BA. 0 
We end this section by introducing the classical possible-world model of belief [ 18, 
19,211 as a particular example of regular belief. We introduce it at this point mainly 
because we need a belief model to illustrate our various definitions of relevance, which 
we will turn to in a moment, and the possible-world model seems to be the most suitable 
simply because many people are familiar with it. 
Since we are not considering nested belief, perhaps the main characteristic of belief 
based on possible-world semantics is its closure under classical logical implication. 
From a knowledge representation point of view, it can be viewed as the beliefs that are 
implicit in a given knowledge base. Following [ 271, we therefore call this type of belief 
implicit belief. 
In possible-world semantics beliefs are characterized by a set W of valuations, also 
called worlds. The worlds in W are meant to be those the agent considers possi- 
ble, that is, for all the agent knows, any one of the worlds in W could be the real 
world.3 Then a sentence cr is believed just in case LY is true in all valuations in W. 
The set Bi of epistemic states of implicit belief is then characterized by all sets of 
worlds. 4 
Definition 7. e E Bi iff for some set of valuations W and for all objective cy, (Y E 
e * VwE W,wka. 
Since the properties of implicit belief are well known, we will not discuss them here 
in detail except for prime implicates. As noted before, prime L&-implicates reduce to the 
familiar notion of prime implicates found in the literature. Given a set of sentences A, 
the prime implicates are simply the smallest clauses that follow from A. 
Lemma 8 (Prime implicates under implicit belief). Let A be a set of objective sen- 
tences. A nontrivial clause c is a prime Bi-implicate of A iff 
(1) /=A>cand 
(2) for all c’ 2 c, #A > c’. 
Proof. The proof follows easily from the fact that, under implicit belief, + Ba > BP 
iff k LY > /? and that b Bc’ > Bc and # Bc > Bc’ implies c’ 5 c. [7 
For example, if A = {(p V q), (p V r V s), us}, then P(A) = {(p V q). (p V r), 7s) 
andP(A,p) ={(pVq),(pVr)}. 
3 Here we do not require the real world to be part of W. In fact, W can be any set including the empty set. 
4 Since our language is finite, epistemic states and sets of worlds are indeed isomorphic. If our language 
contained an infinite number of atoms, there would be more sets of worlds than epistemic states. 
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3. Varieties of relevance 
Given the notion of prime B-implicates, we are now ready to define various forms of 
relevance for arbitrary regular belief models. In the following, let f3 be a regular belief 
model and A a set of objective sentences. In the examples to illustrate the definitions 
we will restrict ourselves to implicit belief (at), which is probably the one the reader is 
most familiar with. In Section 5.1, we will see examples of relevance based on a different 
model of regular belief. The examples in this section make use of the following sets of 
sentences which we already saw in the Introduction: 
Al = {(rain > wet), (sprinkler-on 3 wet)} 
A2 = {(rain > wet), (wet > slippery)} 
A3 = {(rain > umbrella), (Train > umbrella)} 
We begin with the most basic form of relevance, which tells us, roughly, whether 
a given set of sentences contains nontrivial information about a subject matter. Using 
prime B-implicates, this can be expressed very succinctly. 
Definition 9. A is B-relevant to a subject matter T iff there is a prime B-implicate 
which mentions some atom in r. A is B-irrelevant to r iff it is not B-relevant to z-. 
Example 10. Al is easily seen to be &relevant to rain, wet as well as to sprinkler- 
on. Therefore, Al is also &-relevant to any m that includes at least one of those three 
atoms. Furthermore, 01 is Z?t-irrelevant o any other atom such as Jackis_happy, or, 
more generally, to any n- that mentions neither rain nor wet nor sprinkler-on. 
The previous statements also hold if we replace Al by A2 and sprinkler-on by 
slippery. Finally, note that A3 is &irrelevant to rain since P(Bi, As) = {umbrella}. 
The following definition of strict relevance strengthens the previous one by requiring 
that A, in a sense, talks about nothing but 7r. 
Definition 11. A is strictly B-relevant to a subject matter z- iff A is B-relevant to n- 
and every prime B-implicate of A mentions only atoms in 7~. 5 
Example 12. Al clearly is not strictly &-relevant to wet since every prime &-implicate 
mentions some other atom than wet (and similarly for rain and sprinkler-on). 
However, Al is strictly relevant to the combined subject matter rr = {rain, wet, 
sprinkler-on}. A3 is strictly L$-relevant to umbrella. 
Strict relevance turns out to be reducible to mere relevance in the following sense. 
5 In 1251, we defined strict relevance slightly differently in that every prime implicate was only required to 
mention some atom in T, but it could also mention atoms not in fl as well. For our purposes, the current 
definition seems more useful. 
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Theorem 13. A is strictly B-relevant to a subject matter T iff P(Z3, A) is not empty 
and for all p E TA - TT, A is B-irrelevant to p. 
Proof. To prove the only-if direction, let A be strictly B-relevant to 7~ and assume, to 
the contrary that there is a p E TA - T such that A is &relevant to A. Then there 
is a prime B-implicate which mentions p contradicting the assumption that all prime 
B-implicates mention only atoms from r. 
Conversely, assume that P( B, A) is not empty and for all p E TA - TT, A is not 
B-relevant to p, that is, none of the p E TA - VT is mentioned in any of the prime 
a-implicates of A. If TA = ?T then A is clearly strictly B-relevant to r. Otherwise, by 
definition, prime B-implicates of A mention no other atoms than those in 74. Hence 
they mention only atoms in 7~, which implies strict B-relevance. 0 
The following definition relates two subject matters relative to a set of sentences. 
Intuitively, p is relevant to q if A contains nontrivial information about p that in- 
volves q (and vice versa). Again, prime B-implicates allow us to formalize this very 
easily. 
Definition 14. rl is B-relevant to 7r2 with respect to A (denoted as Rf(nl, n-2) ) iff 
some prime B-implicate of A mentions atoms from both z-1 and IQ. 
From the definition we immediately obtain 
Lemma 15. R;( ITI, n-2) holds iff there is an atom p from ~1 and an atom q from ITS 
such that Rf (p, q) holds. 
Example 16. Given Al, we obtain that wet is Bi-relevant to both rain and sprinkler_ 
on, yet rain is not Bi-relevant to sprinkleran. In AZ, rain is not only &-relevant to 
wet, but also to slippery. Finally, rain is not Bi-relevant to umbrella with respect 
to A3. 
As we have seen, under implicit belief, rain is relevant to slippery with respect 
to AZ. The reader familiar with ATMS-style abductive reasoning [29,36] will likely 
come up with the following intuitive explanation for why this is so: wet explains 
slippery given AT. In fact, this connection is no coincidence since abduction is also 
firmly grounded in prime implicates. Intuitively, abductive reasoning is used to answer 
questions like: given an observation CY, what would it take to make cy follow from my 
background knowledge A? Logically speaking, a sentence p explains a, if A together 
with p implies (Y provided /3 is consistent with A. Of course, not all explanations are 
equally useful. In particular, some explanations are more long-winded than others. For 
example, wet A (rain > umbrella) also explains slippery. Such explanations are 
excluded by focusing on so-called minimal explanations. A widely accepted measure of 
minimality is the set of literals contained in an explanation. Prime implicates then play 
the key role in generating minimal explanations. For example, a minimal explanation of 
slippery obtains from a prime implicate c = c’U{slippery} by taking the conjunction 
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of the negation of the literals in c’. In the case of Az, the only minimal explanations are 
rain and wet. 
In our final definition of relevance, we want to capture the idea that the atoms 
mentioned in a minimal explanation of a sentence convey important information about 
this sentence. Before that we need to generalize the notion of a minimal explanation 
to the case of arbitrary regular belief. Luckily this has been done already in [29]. 
Although, as mentioned before, the type of belief considered there is slightly different 
from ours, the definitions carry over without modification. 
Definition 17. Let A be a finite set of sentences. If # A then lits( A) denotes the set of 
literals contained in the CNF-transform of A. The case where A contains only tautologies 
is treated specially in that we ignore the literals altogether, that is, lits(A) = {} if 
+ A. 
Definition 18. Let a be a regular belief model. Given a set of objective sentences A 
and objective sentences a and p, p is called an explanation of LY iff b BA > B(P > a) 
and /# BA > BTP. 
/3 is a minimal explanation of a iff /3 is an explanation of CY and there is no other 
explanation p’ of u with lits(@) 2 lits(p). A minimal explanation is called 
nontrivial if it is not a tautology. 
Example 19. Let A = {p, (lq V r), (lr V lp V s)}. Then the minimal explanations 
of s with respect to A are represented by the sentences q, r, and s. To see how to 
generate minimal explanations from prime implicates for arbitrary sentences, the reader 
is referred to [ 291. 
Definition 20. T is B-relevant to (Y with respect to A (denoted as RXf(r, cu)) iff 
there is a nontrivial minimal explanation of (Y that mentions some p E T. 
Similar to Lemma 1.5 we immediately obtain: 
Lemma 21. RXz(r, a) ifSfor some p E TT, RXf(p, cu). 
Example 22. As already mentioned, we have RX:; (rain, slippery) and RX:; (wet, 
slippery). We also have RX:; (slippery, (Train V umbrella) ). This is because 
( yrain V slippery) is a prime &-implicate and (Train V umbrella) follows from 
lrain. 
Are the two previous definitions of relevance related? For example, is RX;(p, a) 
the same as Rz(p,~,)? To see that they are not, consider A = {sprinkleran > 
wet} and a = (rain V sprinkler-on). Then we certainly have Rf’(wet, m,) since 
(sprinkler-on > wet) is a prime @-implicate of A. However, RXF(wet, cr) does not 
hold, since there is no explanation of LY involving wet. 
On the other hand, under certain conditions, one implies the other. 
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Theorem 23. Let p and q be atoms and A a set of objective sentences mentioning both 
p and q. Let I3 be a regular belief model such that Ba > B(a V /3) is valid and 
nontrivial minimal explanations are conjunctions of literals. 6 Then RX; (p, q) implies 
R?(P, q). 
Proof. Let p be a nontrivial minimal explanation of q such that p mentions p. Then 
+ BA > B(P I q) and # BA > B+. Since p is a conjunction of literals, /? > q 
can be identified with a clause c in the obvious way. If c is a prime &implicate then 
we are done. Otherwise, since A mentions q, Lemma 5 implies that c contains a prime 
implicate c’. If c’ is contained in the clause c* corresponding to -/?, then + Bc’ > B-$3 
by assumption and, therefore, k BA > B-$3, a contradiction. Otherwise, c’ contains 
q and a proper subset of the clauses in c*, contradicting the assumption that p is a 
minimal explanation of q. 0 
We remark that the theorem can be strengthened by replacing q by an arbitrary clause. 
Of course, using prime implicates as the primitive notion, other definitions of relevance 
come to mind as well. For example, we could say that ~1 is strictly relevant to ~2 given 
A if Rd( n-1, ~72) holds and every prime implicate mentioning atoms from ~1 U n-2 
mentions only atoms from ~1 U 7~2. In [25], we said that ~1 subsumes 7r2 given A if 
the prime implicates mentioning ~1 are a superset of those mentioning 7~. We will not 
pursue these variants here and instead concentrate on the core definitions given so far. 
One reason is, as we will show in the next section, that they can be related nicely to 
other forms of relevance discussed in the literature. 
Notation. In the following, whenever it is clear from the context which model of belief 
we are referring to or if it is unimportant, we will not mention B explicitly. That is, we 
will use relevant instead of B-relevant, and write RXp(p, a) and Rd( ~1, IQ) instead of 
RX? (p, a) and Rf (z-1, ~2)) respectively. 
4. More on relevance under implicit belief 
In this section we compare our forms of relevance under implicit belief to three 
approaches in the literature: ( 1) the concept of novelty by Greiner and Genesereth [ 161, 
which was later analyzed in more detail by Marquis [ 341, (2) conditional independence 
by Darwiche and Pearl [ 71, and (3) the notion of forgetting by Lin and Reiter [ 331. 
Furthermore, we establish a number of complexity results regarding the computation of 
relevance relations for implicit belief. 
4. I, Novelty 
Greiner and Genesereth introduce the notion of novelty to capture what it means for 
a sentence to be new to a concept given some background theory A. In other words, 
6 Both conditions are met by implicit and explicit belief. See [ 291 for details. 
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when do we learn something we did not know before about a particular concept if 
new information arrives? In the propositional case, which we focus on here, concepts 
are simply sentences. While the authors originally define novelty in terms of partial 
interpretations, we will use Marquis’ later definition in terms of minimal explanations, 
which he proved equivalent to the original one. The advantage of Marquis’ formulation is 
that it is both easy to grasp and that it elucidates nicely the connection to our own work. 
More precisely, a sentence is novel for another sentence if it yields more explanations 
in the sense defined in the previous section (for implicit belief). 
Definition 24 (Marquis). Given a set of sentences A, a sentence cy is called new to a 
sentence p (denoted as Newp( Ly, /?)) iff there is a minimal explanation of j3 (or -/?) 
with respect to A U {a} which is not a minimal explanation of p (or -j?) with respect 
to A. 
Example 25. Let A = {rain > wet} and (Y = sprinkler-on > wet. Then Newd(a, 
wet) since sprinkler-on is a minimal explanation of wet with respect to AU {a} but 
not with respect to A. 
Since novelty and RX: (r, a) are both defined in terms of minimal explanations, it 
should not surprise that they are related. Here we establish two connections. 
Theorem 26. If NewA (p, cu) then R&(p, a) or =A@, -a). 
Proof. Assume that there is a minimal explanation /? of (Y with respect to A U {p} 
which is not a minimal explanation with respect to A. We will show RXA(p, a). (If 
p is a minimal explanation of T(Y, RXd(p, -KZ) follows by a similar argument.) By 
assumption, there is a minimal p such that AU {p} k p > LX and AU {p} # up. Hence 
A /= /? A p > LY and A # -(p A p). Since p is not a minimal explanation of IZY with 
respect to A, we have A v p > a. It is easy to see that j3 A p is a nontrivial minimal 
explanation of LY which mentions p, that is, RXd(p, cu). q 
To see that the converse does not hold consider A = {up > q}. Clearly RXd(p, q) 
since --p is a minimal explanation of q given A. However A U {p} is equivalent to {p} 
and the only minimal explanation of q with respect to {p} is q which is also a minimal 
explanation of q with respect to A. 
In the case where A is empty it can be shown that NewA( a,p) and RXA(p, a) 
coincide. To prove the theorem, we need the following lemmas. The first one follows 
immediately from results reported in [ 291. 
Lemma 27. Given objective sentences CY and /3 and a set of objective sentences A, /3 
is a minimal explanation of (Y with respect to A under implicit belief iff 
(1) A/=((p~cu) andA#+?. 
(2) For all p’ with lits(@) g lits(/?>, A #(p’ > a). 
Furthermore, if p is a nontrivial minimal explanation of CY, then p is equivalent to a 
conjunction of literals. 
150 G. L.akemeyer/Ariijicial Intelligence 97 (1997) 137-167 
Lemma 28. Let A = {}. Then RXd (p, a) iff cy is relevant to p. 
Proof. It suffices to show that RXd(p, a) iff there is a prime implicate c of LY which 
mentions p. If b LY then the theorem follows immediately since a has no nontrivial 
explanations and no prime implicates mentioning p. Now assume that # LY. 
To prove the if direction, let c = c’ U {p} be a prime implicate of (Y. (The case 
c = c’ U {lp} is completely symmetric.) Then there is a valuation w such that w k cy 
and w + 7~‘. (If c’ is empty, then 1~’ denotes a tautology.) Let P = {q 1 q E 
r, and w k q} U {Tq 1 q E z-a and w k 74). Clearly, P /= cy and P k x’. Let P* 
be a minimal subset of P such that P* k (Y and let /3 be the conjunction of literals in 
P*. (Note that P* cannot be empty since cr is not a tautology by assumption.) Since 
A = {} we have A k p > a. Since p does not contain complementary literals, we also 
have A # -p. Since P* was chosen to be minimal, p is a minimal explanation by the 
above lemma. We are left to show that /3 mentions p. Assume otherwise. Then let w* 
be a valuation which is just like w except that w* b lp. Then w* + p yet w* /#c and 
hence w* w LY, a contradiction. 
For the only-if direction, let /3 be a nontrivial minimal explanation of cy mentioning 
p. Without loss of generality let /3 = p A /?’ where p’ does not mention p. Assume 
there is no prime implicate of (Y mentioning p. Since b LY E P(a) and k p > cy, 
we have b /? > P(a). Since p does not occur in P(cu) we also have k p’ > P(a), 
contradicting the assumption that p is minimal. 0 
Theorem 29. Let A = {}. Then NewA(a,P) $~A(P~~). 
Proof. By the previous lemma it suffices to show that NeWA( a,p) iff cr contains a 
prime implicate c which mentions p. To prove the if direction, we assume without loss 
of generality that c = c’ U {p}. If c’ = {} (that is, b LY > p), then any minimal 
explanation of u with respect to A = {} is equivalent to p A p for some /?. However, 
the only minimal explanations of p with respect to A U {a} = {a} are tautologies since 
{a) b (6?Vyq) 3 ff. Hence NewA( (Y, p) . If c’ # {} then 7~’ is a minimal explanation 
of p with respect to CY because c’ U {p} is a prime implicate of (Y. However, lc’ is not 
a minimal explanation of p with respect to A. More specifically, # lc’ > p because c’ 
does not mention p at all. 
For the only-if direction, let NewA( cr,p) . Without loss of generality, let p be a 
minimal explanation of p with respect to {a} which is not a minimal explanation of p 
with respect to {}. Then {a} k p > p and #p > p. If /3 is a tautology, then {a} b p 
and hence p is a prime implicate of (Y which obviously mentions p. Otherwise, we can 
assume that p is a conjunction of literals, and hence ,8 > p is a prime implicate of (Y 
which mentions p. q 
4.2. Conditional independence 
Recently Darwiche and Pearl (DP) defined conditional independence for disjoint sets 
of atomic propositions [7] in the context of a logical theory. This notion was proposed 
in close analogy to conditional independence in the probabilistic literature, where it 
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is recognized as being of central importance, in particular in areas such as Bayesian 
Networks [ 351. Darwiche [ 61 has pointed out how (logical) conditional independence 
gives rise to a natural notion of relevance, or better, irrelevance. 
In this section we will show a close connection between DP’s notion of relevance and 
ours, in particular, Definition 11, where we define relevance between two sets of atoms 
relative to a given background theory. 
Notation. Let ~1, 7r2, and 7rs denote disjoint sets of atoms. An instantiation iii of rri 
denotes a consistent set of literals over the atoms ~1, that is, iii contains p or lp for 
every p E ~1. For any instantiation %i of ~1, $1 denotes the set of literals which are 
complements of literals in ??I. For example. if ~1 = {p, q, r} and iii = (1p, q, -v}, then 
$1 = {p, lq, r}. Given a set of literals iii, we write [ %I ] to denote the corresponding 
disjunction of literals. Given sets of literals %i and 32, we often write {iji, %2} and 
[ $1, $21 instead of iii U $2 and [ii, U &I, respectively. Finally, all sentences and sets 
of sentences are objective unless noted otherwise. 
Definition 30 (Conditional independence, Darwiche and Pearl). Let ~1, n-2, and 72-s 
be disjoint sets of atomic propositions and A a set of sentences. A finds ~1 independent 
of 7~ given 7rs [ ZA(S-1, 7~3, ~2) ] iff for every instantiation iit, jj2, and ;i3 of ~1, n-2, 
and 7r3, respectively, the logical consistency of A U ii1 U %3 and A U 3?2 U $3 implies 
the logical consistency of A U 6% U 22 U %3. 
Intuitively, ~1 is independent of 7r2 given 7r3 with respect to A if, given full infor- 
mation about 5-s (namely 5?3), adding information about ~1 to A in no way effects the 
information about 7~. 7 Using one of DP’s examples, 
A = {(rain V sprinkler-on) E wet} 
finds {rain} independent of {sprinkler-on}, but finds them dependent given {wet}. 
While our notion of relevance between sets of atoms is only a two-place relation, 
there is nevertheless a tight connection with conditional independence. This is best seen 
using the example Al = {(rain > wet), (sprinkler-on > wet)}. Clearly, rain and 
sprinkler-on are not relevant to each other, that is, Rd, ({rain}, {sprinkleran}) 
does not hold. On the other hand, we obtain that for all possible Z, namely {} and {wet}, 
IdI ({rain}, Z, {sprinkler-on}) holds. Intuitively, this says that not being relevant to 
one another is the strongest case of conditional independence, where one quantifies over 
all possible Z. It turns out that this property holds in general. 
Theorem 31. Let z-1 and ~2 be disjoint sets of atoms and A a finite set of sentences. 
Then Rd (~1,772 ) iff there exists a 7~3 such that ~ZA (~1, n-3,53). 8 
’ This definition is also used in the relational database literature to characterize what they call embedded 
nzultivulued dependencies. 
’ ~13( z-1, n-3, n-2) is short for I*( ~1, q, ~2) does not hold. We will use the same convention for other 
abbreviations such as lNewd(p, cu) as well. 
152 G. Lakemeyer/Artijicial Intelligence 97 (1997) 137-167 
Proof. To prove the only-if direction let us assume that Rd( ~1, ~2) holds. Then, by 
definition, there is a c E P(A) such that c mentions atoms from both n-1 and 7r2. Thus 
c = [ij3,+?{,;j;] for some rr{, 5-h, and n-3 such that r{ & q, n-i C rr2, rr{ # (), and 
~6 # {}. We want to show that lI4(~1,7~3,~2). 
Since c E P(A), A # [4?3,ij{] and A # [%3,%4], but A k [63,%:,?2]. If we 
choose $3, %;, and $i as instantiations of ~3, ri, and rrk, respectively, we obtain that 
TI ;;I 
AU{%3, %i} and AU{&, $,} are both consistent, while AU{%s, 71,) ~77~) is inconsistent. 
Hence ~1~(7ri,7rs,&~). 
Since A U {%3,%;} and A U {%3,%;} are consistent, there are iii and ;;i2 with %i C: 
ii, and $L cl 65 such that A U ($3, $1) and A U ($3, %5,} are consistent. Since A U 
{%s,%i,%L} is inconsistent, then so is AU {&,?i,%2}. Hence ~Z~(z-r,~s,rr2). 
To prove the if direction, assume that Rd(rt, n-2) does not hold, that is, for all 
c E P(A), c does not mention atoms from both 7;ri and ~2. Let 7r3 be any set of atoms 
(possibly the empty set) disjoint from ?TI and 5-2. We now show that ZA(~T1, 7r3,7r2) 
holds. Assume, to the contrary, that lZ4( n-1, 7r3,~2). Then there are $1, $2, and $3 such 
that A U {5?3, $1) and A U {&, $2) are consistent, yet A U (33, $1, %2} is inconsistent. 
Therefore, A k [&,$I ,&I. Hence, by the definition of prime implicates, there is a 
c E P(A) contained in [zs, $1, $21, that is, c mentions only atoms from ~1, n-2, and 
~3. By assumption, c does not mention atoms from both rrl and 272. Hence there are 
two cases. 
(a) c mentions atoms from ~1 and 7q only. Then A U {4?3,65} is inconsistent, 
contradicting our assumptions. 
(b) c mentions atoms from 7r2 and 7~3 only. Then A U (65, $2) is inconsistent, 
contradicting our assumptions. 
Since we obtain a contradiction in both cases, our initial assumption must be false. 
Hence Zd(q, ~,7r2) holds. Cl 
4.3. Forgetting 
In [ 331, Lin and Reiter (LR) introduce a form of forgetting all the information 
about a proposition in a given set of sentences, which they use, among other things, to 
define notions of remembering and (ir-) relevance. 9 We will see that the LR notions 
of forgetting and remembering relate directly to our definitions of relevance and strict 
relevance (Corollary 38 and 39). The LR notion of relevance, on the other hand, is 
closely connected to R4( rr1,7r~) and RXd(p, (Y) (Theorems 47 and 48). 
LR’s idea of forgetting has a very simple semantic interpretation. Suppose we are 
given a set of objective sentences A. Then this corresponds to the set of all worlds W 
which satisfy A. Forgetting p in A has the following effect on W: for each world w in 
W add another world w* to W, where w* is exactly like w except that the truth value 
of p is flipped, that is w* b p iff w k 1~. This way W gets bigger, which means that 
fewer sentences are now true in all worlds than before. In other words, W now believes 
fewer sentences than before. The sentences that are no longer believed are precisely 
9 While LR treat first-order formulas, we restrict ourselves to the propositional case. 
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those where p plays an essential role. LR show that the sentences that are believed after 
forgetting p have the following simple syntactic characterization. In fact, we will use 
the syntactic form as the definition of forgetting. 
Definition 32 (Forgetting). Let true stand for an arbitrary tautology and false for 
ltrue. Let A be a finite set of objective sentences and p an atomic proposition. Let 
Ai be the result of replacing every occurrence of p in A by true and let A; be 
the result of replacing every occurrence of p in A by false. Then f orget( A;p) = 
(A; V A,). 
Example 33. If A = {(p V q) , (1p V r), (p V s) , t}, then f orget( A; p) is equivalent 
to ((4V r),t}. 
Notice that forgetting what is known about p may mean forgetting about other atoms 
as well. Here, for example, we also lose any information we had about s. Semantically 
speaking, since there is a world w satisfying A where p is true and s is false, then after 
forgetting p we admit a world w* which is just like w except that p is false. w* no 
longer satisfies (p V s) . 
Before we get to the comparison with our framework, we need a bit of technical 
material from LR. Lemmas 34-36 and Theorem 37 below about forgetting were first 
proved in [ 331 or follow from results contained in that paper. We reprove them here to 
make the paper self-contained and because proofs in our propositional framework are 
generally simpler. 
Lemma 34. A k Ap’ V A;. 
Proof. Let w be a world that satisfies A. If w b p, then clearly, w k A;. Otherwise, 
w k A;. Thus, in any case, we obtain w b Af V A;. 0 
Lemma 35. For any objective sentence a not mentioning p, if A k a, then A; V Ai 
I= ff. 
Proof. Without loss of generality, let us assume that A is a set of clauses. Let A b (Y 
and assume Al V A; v CY, that is, w k Al V A; and w # (Y for some world w. Suppose 
w t= p, (The case where w + up is completely symmetric.) If w k A:, then clearly 
w + A and, hence, w + (Y follows by assumption. Otherwise, w b A;. A can be 
partitioned into three sets Al, AZ, and A3, where Al does not mention p at all, every 
clause in A2 contains p only positively, and A3 has only negative occurrences of p. By 
construction of Al,, w satisfies every clause in Al which does not mention p (since 
Al C A,;). Also, for every clause in AZ, w satisfies at least one literal other than p, 
since A; has p replaced by false. To obtain a world that satisfies all of A, consider w* 
which satisfies up and is otherwise exactly like w. Then clearly w* satisfies Al and 42 
as before. Also A3 is satisfied since every clause in A3 contains 7~. Hence w satisfies 
A. However, w* # LY since LY does not mention p, contradicting the assumption that 
Aba. Cl 
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Lemma 36. forget( A;p) is logically equivalent to {c E P(A) 1 c does not mention 
PI. 
Proof. It suffices to show that P( AZ V At;) = {c E P(A) 1 c does not mention p}. 
((I) Let c E P( Ai V A;). Since c clearly does not mention p, it suffices to show 
that c E P(A). Since A k Ai V A; (Lemma 34), A k c. Suppose c $ P(A). 
Then there is some c’ such that c’ 2 c and A /= c’. Since c does not mention 
p, neither does c’. By Lemma 35, Ai V A; k c’, contradicting the assumption 
that c is a prime implicate of AZ V A;. Hence c E P(A). 
(2) Let c E P(A) where c does not mention p and assume, to the contrary, that 
c # P( Ap’ V A,;). By Lemma 35, Ap’ V Ap k c. Hence, there must be some c’ 
such that c’ s c and Al V A; b c’. Then, by Lemma 34, A k c’, contradicting 
the assumption that c E P(A). 0 
For atoms pi,. . . , Pk, LR define forget(A;pl,...,pk) as forget(forget(A;pi, 
. ..>Pk-I).pk). 
Theorem 37. forget (A; ~1, . . . , pk) is logically equivalent to {c E P(A) 1 c does not 
mention any atOmS in {PI,. . . , pk}}. 
Proof. The proof is by induction on k. 
If k = 1, the theorem holds by Lemma 36. Assume the theorem holds for k - 1. By 
definition, forget(A;pi,. . . ,pk) = forget(forget(A;pi,. . . ,pk-1);pk). Hence, by 
induction, f orget( A; ~1,. . . , pk) = forget(A’;pk), where A’ = {c E P(A) 1 c does 
not mention ~1,. . . , pk_ t }. We need to show that f orget( A’; pk) is logically equivalent 
to {c E P(A) 1 c does not mention ~1,. . . ,pk}. 
By definition, forget(A’;pk) is logically equivalent to {c E P( A’) I c does not 
mention pk}. We now show that A’ = P( A’). 
(C) Let c E A’ and assume that c # P( A’). Then there is a c’ E P( A’) such that 
c’ s c and A’ k c’. Since c E A’, then c E P(A), and since A’ k c’, A /= c’, 
contradicting the assumption that c E P(A). Hence c E P( A’). 
( 2) Let c E P( A’) and assume c @ A’. Since c does not mention ~1,. . . , pk__l, 
c @ P(A) (otherwise c would be in A’). Since A k c, there is a c’ E P(A) 
such that c’ 5 c. Since c does not mention p1 , . . . , pk-_l , neither does c’ and, 
hence, c’ E A’, contradicting the assumption that c is a prime implicate of A. 
Thus we proved that f orget( A’; pk) = {c E A’ I c does not mention pk} = {c E P(A) I 
cdoesnotmentionpi,...,pk}. 0 
From this theorem we immediately obtain a direct correspondence with our notion of 
23i-relevance. 
COlWllary 38. A is k$-relevant to {PI,. . . , pk} i# # f orget( A; p1, . . . ,pk) E A. 
Corollary 39. f orget( A; ~1,. . . , pk) is equivalent to the largest subset of P( A) which 
is irrelevant to r = {pl , . . . ,pk}. 
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Given forget, LR define remember(A;pi, . . . ,pk) as a function which forgets all 
information about atoms other than pi,. . . , pk. 
Definition 40 (Remembering). Let A be a set of sentences such that the only atoms 
occurring in A are ~1,. . . , pk and pk+r , . . . , p,,. Then 
remember( A; ~1,. . . >pk) =forget(A;pk+l,...,pn). 
One might be tempted to read remember( A;pl, . . . ,pk) as “remember everything 
you know about p] , . . . ,Pk’). As the following example shows, though, this is not quite 
right. 
Example 41. Let us consider the same A as in Example 33, that is, A = ((p V q) , (up V 
Y) , (p V s) , t}. It is not hard to see that remember( A; p) reduces to true (a tautol- 
ogy). In other words, we do not remember anything in this case. This is so because, 
remember( A; p) = f orget( A; q, r, s, t), that is, we are forced to forget all clauses that 
mention any atom other than p, which is everything. 
In the following theorem, LR provide a very simple characterization of what their 
notion of remembering extracts from a given set of sentences. (The result follows easily 
from Theorem 37.) 
Theorem 42. remember( A; ~1,. . . ,pk) is logical6y equivalent to {c E P(A) 1 c men- 
tiOnSOdyatOmSin {pI,...,pk}}. 
This then gives us a direct connection to strict relevance as defined in this paper. 
Corollary 43. A is strict/y ~~-EdeWZnt to {pi,. . . , pk} ifl + remember( A; ~1,. . . , pk) 
= A. - 
Corollary 44. remember( A; ~1,. . . , pk) is the largest subset of P( A) which is strictly 
relevant to {pi,. . , pk}. 
Based on forget LR go on to define a notion of (ir-)relevance relative to answering 
a query posed to a knowledge base and the sentences that could possibly be learned 
(= added to the knowledge base) in the future. Ignoring future information for a mo- 
ment, an atom p is said to be irrelevant for answering q in the knowledge base A 
just in case A and f orget( A; p) produce the same answer for q. Consider the follow- 
ing example, where A = {(p > q), I} and q is the query. Intuitively, while Y seems 
clearly irrelevant to answering q, p should somehow count as relevant. However, both 
A and forget(A;p) = {r} p ro d uce the same answer when asking whether q holds, 
namely unknown. This is where possible future extensions of A come in. For exam- 
ple, if p is among the sentences that could be added at some point, then A U {p} 
and forget (A; p) U {p} differ with respect to q, since the former would produce the 
answer yes and the latter unknown. On the other hand, A and forget(A; r) would 
always produce the same answers for q no matter what information is added to them. 
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Hence by considering future extensions of a knowledge base, LR obtain a reason- 
able notion of distinguishing relevant from irrelevant information when answering a 
query. 
Definition 45. Let At and A2 be two finite sets of sentences, C a set of learnable 
sentences and C_Y a sentence. 
(1) Al and A2 are equivalent with respect to Q (Al x, AZ) iff 
(a) Al b LY iff A2 b LY and 
(b) Al k YY iff A2 k -MY. 
(2) Al and A2 are equivalent with respect to (Y and .C (AI x,,~ 42) iff for all 
C’ 2 ,C, Al U L’ M, A2 U .C’ whenever Al U L’ and A2 U C’ are consistent. 
Definition 46. Let A be a finite set of sentences, L: a set of learnable sentences, p an 
atomic proposition, and LY a sentence. 
Then p is irrelevant for answering (Y in A iff A ze,~ forget (A; p) . p is relevant for 
answering CY in A if p is not irrelevant for answering cr in A. 
The following theorem tells us that Rd( ~t,q) can be expressed in terms of relevance 
a la LR. Unfortunately, the formulation of the embedding is somewhat technical. 
Theorem 47. Let A be a set of sentences, 7~1 and IT? disjoint sets of atoms, and L 
the set of all literals. R~(TI, ~2) iff there is an (Y mentioning only atoms in n-2 and a 
p E z-1 such that p is not irrelevant for answering CY in A. 
Proof. Since the form of A does not matter we assume, without loss of generality, that 
A = P(A), i.e. A consists only of its own prime implicates. By Lemma 36, we can then 
assume that forget(A;p) = {c 1 c E A and c does not mention p}. 
To prove the only-if direction of the theorem, let RP (~1, ~2). We need to show that 
there is an LY mentioning only atoms in 712 and a p E z-1 such that p is not irrelevant 
for answering LY in A. Since Rd (~1, n-2)) there is a clause c E A mentioning atoms from 
bothri andrT.Letc= [??i’,,G~,G?s] lo such that ?l consists of all the literals in c that 
mention atoms in rrt, G?G consists of all the literals in c that mention atoms in 7~2, and 
$3 contains the rest. Let .C’ = {G;, z3}, a = [ ?ii], and p be any atom mentioned in %i. 
(Note that there must be at least one by assumption.) Since c is a prime implicate of 
A, A U L’ is consistent and so is f orget( A; p) U 13’. By construction, A U L’ k CY. It is 
not hard to see that f orget( A; p) U 13’ # cr; for otherwise forget (A; p) ( C A) would 
contain a clause c’ s c, contradicting the assumption that c is a prime implicate. 
To prove the if direction, assume that Rd( ~1, n-2) does not hold. We need to show 
that for all a mentioning only atoms in 7r2 and for all p E ~1, p is irrelevant for 
answering (Y in A. It is easy to see that this amounts to showing that for any clause c 
mentioning only atoms from 7r2, any p E nl and L’ C L such that A U L’ is consistent, 
AUL’/=ciffforget(A;p)UL’~c. 
I(’ We use the same notation as in the previous ubsection. 
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The if direction follows immediately, because b A > f orget( A;p). To prove the 
only-if direction, let A U C’ k c. A U L? b c iff A k [p, c] . If k [ :‘, c] , we are done, 
since then f orget( A;p) k [:‘, c] and, hence, f orget(A;p) U L’ k c. Otherwise, 
there is a prime implicate c* E A such that c* c [E, c]. Note that c* must mention at 
least one literal in c which is not in 3, since otherwise A U L’ would be inconsistent. 
Hence c* mentions an atom from 7~2. Since Rd( ~1, n-2) does not hold, there are no 
prime implicates mentioning atoms from both ~1 and 7~. By Lemma 36, c* is a prime 
implicate of f orget( A;p) as well. Therefore f orget( A;p) k [p U c] and, hence, 
forget(A;p) UC' b c. 0 
The final result in this comparison sheds some new light on what LR’s form of 
relevance really means provided we restrict ourselves to literals as learnable sentences. 
In that case, p is relevant for answering Q in A just in case p occurs in a minimal 
explanation of either cr or Y(Y. 
Theorem 48. Let L be the set of all Eiterals, A a set of objective sentences, and LY an 
objective sentence not mentioning the atom p. Then p is relevant for answering cy in A 
ifSRXd(p, a) or R&(p, -a). 
Proof. To prove the if direction, let RXd(p, a). (The case where RXd(p, T(Y) holds 
is treated the same way.) Then there is a nontrivial minimal explanation p of (Y which 
mentions p. In particular, by Lemma 27, we can assume that p is a conjunction of 
literals p = Ii A . . . A I,, such that A # -/3 and A k (p > a). Let {Zi} be short for 
{II,.. . ,1,}. Then A U {li} b a. It suffices to show that f orget( A; p) U {Zi} # a. 
Assume, to the contrary, that f orget( A; p) U {li} b ct. Clearly, f orget( A; p) U {ii} is 
consistent because AU {li} is assumed to be consistent and P( f orget( A; p) ) C P(A). 
Since neither cy nor P(forget(A;p)) mention p, we have that forget(A;p) U {Ii} - 
{p, lp} I= a. But then A U {li} - {P, 7~) k cx, contradicting the assumption that 
p=1, /I... A 1, is minimal. 
Conversely, let p be relevant for answering LY in A and suppose that neither RXd(p, a) 
nor RXd(p, ~a) holds. Then there is some L C L such that A U L & forget (A; p) 
U L. Without loss of generality let A U L k a and f orget( A; p) U L # (Y. (The case 
AU L #a and forget(A;p) U L k cy cannot arise since P(forget(A;p)) 2 P(A). 
The case for SLY follows by a symmetric argument.) Since RXd(p, a> does not hold, 
we obtain that none of the nontrivial minimal explanations of LY mention p. Now let 
L- = L \ {p, lp} and let p be the conjunction of literals in L- (L is finite because we 
assume a finite language). Since A U L k LY and, by assumption, none of the minimal 
explanations of cy mentions p, A U L- /= a. Therefore, A k (p 3 a). Let a* = A q 
be (/3 > cz) converted into conjunctive normal form. Then 
Ak((p>a) iff P(A) +a* 
iff VCti3C E P(A) S.t. C C (Yi 
iff VCU~~C E P(forget(A;p)) s.t. c G “Yi 
(since neither ai nor c mention p and by Lemma 36) 
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iff forget(A;p) k LY* 
iff forget(A;p) k (/3 > a) 
iff f orget( A; p) U L- b a. 
Hence f orget( A; p) U L k a, contradicting the assumption that f orget( A; p) U L # 
a. q 
Let A, a, p, and fZ be as in the theorem. Then, together with Theorem 26, we imme- 
diately obtain the following connection between the LR notion of relevance and Greiner 
and Genesereth’s novelty. 
Corollary 49. If p is irrelevant to answering LY in A, then TNewd (p, a). 
4.4. Computational properties 
In this section we consider the computational cost of finding out various relevance 
relations for implicit belief. We summarize the results first and then list the theorems 
and proofs in the rest of the section. 
To make a long story short, the news is not all that good. Determining relevance 
for implicit belief is intractable in general. That is not really surprising since rele- 
vance requires us to test for satisfiability (Theorems 50). A more interesting ques- 
tion is whether tractability obtains if we restrict ourselves to formulas where satis- 
fiability can be determined efficiently, which is the case for Horn clauses [lo]. It 
turns out that testing whether A in Horn form is (strictly) relevant to r is indeed 
easy (Theorems 5 1 and 52). Also, in the case of Rd(p, q), if p and q only oc- 
cur positively in A, then we can immediately conclude that they are not relevant to 
each other (Theorem 53). However, all other cases seem to be hard, even for Horn 
clauses. In particular, we obtain NP-completeness results for Rd (p, q) and RXd(p, q) 
(Theorems 54 and 55). In essence, this is so because the problem is very similar 
to finding explanations in an ATMS [ 361, whose computational cost was examined 
in [37]. 
Theorem 50. Determining whether a set of objective sentences A is strictly relevant to 
v is W-hard. The same holds if we replace “strictly relevant” by “relevant”. 
Proof. Let A be arbitrary and let rr = ?rA. It suffices to show that A is satisfiable iff 
1A is strictly relevant to rr. Clearly, if 1A has any nontrivial prime implicates at all, 
then they mention only atoms in Z-. Thus 1A is strictly relevant to v iff # 7A iff A is 
satisfiable. 
Note that the same construction works in the case of relevance because 7A is strictly 
relevant to rr iff 7A is relevant to n-. 0 
Theorem 51. Given a set of Horn clauses A, determining whether A is relevant to r 
is tractable. 
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Proof. Here we use the fact that Horn clauses can be tested for satisfiability in linear 
time [ lo]. Hence the problem whether a clause follows from a set of Horn clauses 
can be solved in linear time as well. The following method tests whether A is relevant 
to lr: 
1. function Relevant?( A, T-) 
/* Returns YES if A is relevant to rr and NO otherwise. */ 
2. for all p E IT do 
3. for all c in A which contain fp do 
4. if A /= c - {*p} then replace c in A by c - {*p} 
5. else return YES 
6. od. 
7. od. 
8. return NO. 
9. end. 
The correctness of the function follows from the following observations. 
Line 4. If A + c-{&p} then replacing c in A by c - { *p} preserves logical equivalence 
with the original set. 
Line 5. If A # c - {&p} then *p must be a member of some prime implicate of A. 
Line 8. If line 8 is reached, then all occurrences of atoms from 71 have been removed 
from A while logical equivalence with the original set has been preserved. 
Finally, since deduction in Horn logic is linear, the algorithm runs in time 0( 1~1 x 
IAl>. 0 
Theorem 52. If A is Horn then determining whether A is strictly relevant to T is 
tractable. 
Proof. By Theorem 13, A is strictly relevant to n iff P(A) is not empty and for all 
p E VA - T, A is not relevant to p. Testing whether P(A) is empty is the same 
as testing whether A is valid, which is trivial for clauses: simply test each clause for 
complementary literals. Finally, testing whether for all p E TA - T, A is not relevant to 
p is tractable by the previous theorem. Cl 
Theorem 53. If A is Horn and p and q occur only positively in A, then ERA (p, q) . 
Proof. We use the fact that every prime implicate of a set of Horn clauses is itself 
Horn. Since a Horn clause contains at most one positive literal, it suffices to show that 
no nontrivial prime implicate of A contains negative occurrences of p or q. Assume 
otherwise, that is, without loss of generality, let c = c’ U {-p} be a prime implicate of 
A, where c’ does not mention p. Then A PC’, that is, there is a valuation w such that 
w + A and w # c’. Let w* be just like w except that w* k p. Since p occurs only 
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positively in A, w* + A, yet w* # c, contradicting the assumption that c is a prime 
implicate of A. 0 
Theorem 54. Given two atoms p and q and a set of Horn clauses A, determining 
whether Rd(p, q) holds is W-complete. 
Pnaof. To prove NP-hardness, we adapt a reduction technique used in Theorem 2 of 
[ 371, that is, we reduce the NP-complete problem “path with forbidden pairs”(PWPP) 
[ 141 to the problem at hand. Let G = (VA) be a directed graph, p, q E V and let 
(ai,bl),... , (a,,, 6, ) be pairs of vertices from V. In the PWFP problem the question 
is whether there is a path from p to q that contains at most one vertex from each pair 
(ai, bi). 
The problem was shown to remain NP-complete even if G is acyclic, which we 
assume from now on. As a further simplification, we assume that p has no incoming 
edges and q has no outgoing edges. (Since G is acyclic, this assumption can be made 
without loss of generality.) Finally, we assume that neither p nor q occur as vertices 
in the pairs (ai, bi) . For otherwise, we simply consider a graph G* = (V*, E*), where 
V* = VU {p*, q*} for new vertices p* and q* and E* extends E by adding an edge from 
p* to p and an edge from q to q*. Obviously, G contains a path from p to q containing 
at most one vertex from each (al, bi) iff such a path exists in G* from p* to q*. 
Given an instance of this restricted PWFP, the reduction to Rd(p, q) proceeds as 
follows. First, we construct the background theory A by introducing the following 
clauses: 
l For each directed edge (x, w) in G, introduce the clause ((x A xy) > y), where 
xl’ is a unique new atom. 
l For each forbidden pair (ai, bi) introduce the clause ( Tai V lbi) . 
By definition, Rd(p, q) holds iff there is a prime implicate of A which mentions both 
p and q. Given the construction of A, it is not hard to see that such a prime implicate 
exists iff it is of the form (-pV~p” V..,VTT::, Vq), where (p,xl,...,x,,q) 
denotes a path in G from p to q containing at most one vertex from each (ai, bi) , which 
completes the reduction. 
An algorithm that shows that determining relevance between p and q is in NP goes as 
follows: Guess an arbitrary Horn clause c containing both p and q (or their negations) 
and which mentions each atom in A at most once and no other atoms. This clause is 
clearly polynomial in the length of A. Then test whether c is a prime implicate of A 
mentioning both p and q, which can be done by testing logical implication of c and 
repeated removal of literals. Testing logical implication in Horn theories can be done in 
linear time and there are at most ICI iterations involved. Hence the problem is in NI? 0 
Theorem 55. The problem of determining whether RXd(p, q) holds is NP-complete 
even if A is restricted to Horn clauses. 
Proof. Selman and Levesque have shown in [ 371 that determining whether a set of Horn 
clauses contains a minimal explanation of an atom q that mentions p is NP-complete. 
This is exactly the same as determining whether RXd(p,q) holds. 0 
G. L.akemeyer/Art@cial Intelligence 97 (1997) 137-167 161 
5. Explicit belief 
We now turn to explicit belief. While implicit belief represents the strongest form 
of regular belief in that it allows an agent to draw all conclusions which are pos- 
sible according to classical logic, explicit belief, in a sense, represents the other ex- 
treme, that is, an agent using this model of belief, is only able to perform very 
simple deductions. For example, in contrast to implicit belief, explicitly believing 
(p V q) A (74 V r) does not necessarily force the agent to believe (p V r). One 
may think of explicit belief as modeling a resource-bounded shallow reasoner. l1 If the 
agent’s knowledge base is in conjunctive normal form, inferences amount to little more 
than retrieval of clauses. Nevertheless, since the model is regular, all our definitions 
of relevance introduced in Section 3 apply and have overall very nice computational 
properties. 
The semantics of B for explicit belief rests on a three-valued extension of valuations 
(worlds), which we call situations. While worlds assign a truth value to every atomic 
proposition, situations, in contrast, assign truth values to all the liter& with the restric- 
tion that either p or up is assigned true. In other words, situations, in contrast to worlds, 
allow atoms to have contradictory truth values. t* 
Definition 56 (Situations). A situation s is a set of literals such that for every atom p, 
either p E s or up E: s. 
In other words, every atom p is either true or false at a situations s, but, in contrast 
to valuations, s may also support both the truth and falsity of p. 
Since situations assign independent truth values to literals and their complements, the 
semantic rules for arbitrary sentences must define truth support for both sentences and 
their negations. Let p be an atom, CY and /3 arbitrary sentences, and s a situation. 
With that we take the epistemic states & of explicit belief to be those that correspond 
to truth in all situations of a given set of situations. More precisely, 
” See also [28]. 
I2 For those uncomfortable with the idea of inconsistent truth assignments, Fagin, Halpem, and Vardi [ 131 
discuss an equivalent semantics, which retains the use of classical worlds at the expense of a nonstandard 
interpretation of negation. 
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Definition 57 (Epistemic states of explicit belief). e E Be iff for some set of situations 
S and for all objective (Y, (Y E e +=+ V’s E S, s k (Y. 
Note that the only difference between Be and Bi considered previously is the use of 
situations instead of valuations. 
This model of explicit belief is precisely that of [ 291 and is closely related to [ 271, 
which uses four-valued situations, which in turn originated in relevance logic [ 111. 
Lemma 58. k$ is a regular belief model. 
Proof. Levesque showed in [ 271 that the sentences under conditions (3) and (4) of the 
definition of regular belief are axioms in his four-valued logic of explicit belief. Since 
the three-valued models considered here form a proper subset of Levesque’s models, 
those sentences are also valid in our logic. Showing that conditions ( 1) and (2) of 
regular belief hold for explicit belief is a trivial exercise. 0 
While & and Bi are both regular, explicit belief is otherwise much weaker than 
implicit belief. Most importantly, explicit belief is not closed under Modus ponens, that 
is the set {BP, B(p > q) , -Bq} is satisfiable. To see why this is so, simply choose 
S = {s} with {p, -p, Tq} C s. 
A comprehensive discussion of explicit belief can be found in [ 271. Thus we will 
not discuss the properties of B in detail here. What makes explicit belief interesting 
for our purposes is that it allows for tractable reasoning in the sense that, if we have 
objective cy and p, both in conjunctive normal form (CNF) , then deciding whether B/3 
is logically implied by Ba is tractable [ 27,291. The algorithm is very simple and relies 
on the following result. 
Theorem 59 (Levesque) . Let (Y and /3 be objective sentences in CNF. Then + Ba > 
BP ifffor every clause c in /3 one of the following properties holds: 
( 1) c is trivial, that is, it contains complementary literals. 
(2) There is a clause c’ in a such that c’ C c. 
The corresponding algorithm, of course, can be computed in time 0(/a] x IPI). I3 
Notice that modus ponens is ruled out as a valid inference rule, that is, an agent who 
believes p and p > q does not necessarily believe q. The assumption that both ok and 
p are in CNF is essential here, for otherwise the problem still remains co-NF’-complete 
[27]. However, requiring conjunctive normal form is acceptable for most purposes. 
For one, if we think of (Y as the knowledge base, then adding new information to the 
knowledge base in CNF only requires the new information to be converted into CNF. 
For another, queries or, for that matter, new information to be added, tend to be much 
smaller than the knowledge base itself. Hence, while conversion of a sentence into CNF 
can result in an exponential blow-up, if /!I is at most logarithmic in size of the knowledge 
I3 Apart from testing for trivial clauses, the algorithm in fact computes fuutological enfailmenf, a fragment of 
relevance logic [ 1, I 11. 
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base, then the conversion into CNF remains polynomial in the size of the knowledge 
base. 
As in the case of implicit belief it is easy to see that prime &-implicates of a set 
of sentences A are the smallest nontrivial clauses (in terms of set inclusion) that are 
believed given that the sentences in A are believed. 
Lemma 60 (Prime &-implicates). Let A be an objective sentence and c a clause. 
Then a nontrivial clause c is a prime &-implicate iff 
(I) /=BA>Bc. 
(2) For all c’ s c, # BA > Bc’. 
Proof. The lemma follows easily from the following two observations: 
(a) c’ s c is equivalent to /= Bc’ > Bc and # Bc > Bc’, which follows immediately 
from Theorem 59. 
(b) If conditions (1) and (2) of the lemma hold for a clause c then c mentions 
no atoms other than those in A, which again follows immediately from Theo- 
rem 59. Cl 
Example 61. Let A = {(p V q),(lq V r), (q Vp V s)}. Then P(&,A) = {(p V 
q) , (14 V r) }. Note the difference to P( Bt , A), which also contains (p V r). In general, 
P(E&, A) need not be contained in P(A). For instance, if A = {p, (p > q)}, then 
P(&T A) = {p, q}, yet P(Bet7,, A) = {P, (P 3 4)). 
Theorem 62. The set of prime &-implicates of a set of clauses A can be computed in 
W/A12). 
Proof. Since explicitly believing a clause c follows from explicitly believing A iff 
A contains a clause subsuming c, the following naive procedure suffices to generate 
P(&, A). 
For each clause c in A, remove c from A if one of the following conditions 
holds: 
( 1) c is a tautology, that is, c contains complementary literals. 
(2) There is another clause in A which properly contains c. 
At the end of this procedure, A = P(&, A). This follows immediately from the defi- 
nition of prime &-implicates and Theorem 59. Furthermore, this procedure is obviously 
computable in quadratic time in the size of A. 0 
Note that, in contrast to prime &-implicates, there are only polynomially many prime 
&-implicates. In fact, prime &-implicates form a subset of the clauses in A. 
5.1. Relevance based on explicit belief 
Since explicit belief is regular, all the definitions of relevance of Section 3 carry over. 
Naturally, the relevance relation obtained under explicit belief are, in general, different 
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from those under implicit belief. Here we consider examples using the same sentences 
as in Section 3, which exhibit similarities as well as key differences between &- and 
ai-relevance. 
Al = {(rain > wet), (sprinkler-on > wet)} 
AZ= {(rain> wet),(wet 3 slippery)} 
A3 = {(rain > umbrella), (Train > umbrella)} 
Relevance between sentences and subject matters. The 23i- and &relevance relations 
between Al (42) and a subject matter rr are exactly the same. This is so because the 
same atoms occur in the prime E$-implicates and the prime &-implicates of these 
sets. A difference obtains in As, which is &-relevant yet not &-relevant to rain. 
Similarly, As is strictly &-relevant to {rain,umbrella}, again in contrast to implicit 
belief. 
@(rrr , rr2) versus l&q, 4. Rf; (al, 7~2) and Rz: (~I,~Tz) coincide because the 
prime &-implicates and prime &-implicates of Al are the same. This is not true for 
AZ. While wet is &-relevant to rain with respect to AZ, rain is not &-relevant to 
slippery, since (rain > slippery) is not a prime &-implicate. Finally, rain is 
&-relevant to umbrella with respect to As, yet this is not true under implicit belief. 
RX?(n, (Y) versus RXt(?r, (Y). As we saw earlier, we get RX:; (slippery, (Trainv 
umbrella) ) On the other hand, RX:; (slippery, ( yrain V umbrella) ) does not hold 
because slippery does not occur in any prime &-implicate together with either rain 
or umbrella. (Note that P( &,, 42) = AZ. 
5.2. Computing relevance based on explicit belief 
It turns out that for arbitrary sets of clauses, all versions of relevance can be computed 
efficiently, provided that, in the case of RX: (p, a), CY is a clause. 
Theorem 63. Let A be a set of arbitrary clauses, c a clause, r, ~1, and ~2 subject 
matters no larger than A. Then the following problems can be determined in time 
O(1A12). 
( 1) Is A &-relevant to 7~? 
(2) Is A strictly &-relevant to rr? 
(3) Does R?(IT~,~T~) hold? 
(4) Does RX2 (p, c) hold? 
Proof. By Theorem 62, the prime &-implicates of A form a subset of A and can be 
computed in 0( A2). 
( 1) -( 3) After computing P( 23,) A), the conditions for the various notions can then 
easily be verified. For example, to determine strict &relevance test whether each prime 
&-implicate mentions only atoms from 7r. To determine whether R? (VI,~TT) holds, 
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simply test for each clause in P(&, A) whether it mentions atoms from both ~1 and 
~2. Provided the subject matters are no larger than A, all this can obviously be done in 
0(A2). 
(4) Determining whether RX?(p, c) holds was shown by Levesque [29] to be 
computable in O( A*). 0 
While deciding RX>@, c) is easy, this does not seem likely in the case of 
RX? (p, a), where LY is an arbitrary sentence. If LY is in CNF, Levesque [ 291 showed 
that the minimal explanations of (Y can be obtained in the following way. For each 
clause ai in (Y, let Mi be the set of minimal explanations of LY. Then consider the 
disjunctive normal form D of Ai VeEM,. Each disjunct of D is a minimal explanation of 
cy. The problem is that generating the DNF can lead to an exponential blow-up. While 
computing RX? (p, cw) , strictly speaking, does not require us to compute all minimal 
explanations, it is not clear whether this can be avoided. In fact, we conjecture that it 
can’t. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed various definitions of relevance that apply to a wide class 
of belief models including those that are suitable for reasoners with very limited re- 
sources. The definitions rely on a notion of prime implicate that generalizes its classical 
counterpart to other forms of belief, We considered the specific cases of relevance un- 
der implicit and explicit belief and analyzed the complexity of determining relevance 
relations in each case. Furthermore, in connection with implicit belief, we demonstrated 
tight connections between our work and the notions of novelty, conditional indepen- 
dence, and forgetting. While all these approaches evolved independently with different 
motivations in mind, this paper has uncovered common ground among them. 
We feel that our work may be helpful in getting a better handle on queries such as 
“tell me all you know about +‘. First of all, relevance and strict relevance suggest two 
possible meanings: find all the prime implicates mentioning at least some of the atoms 
in n-, or, find all the prime implicates mentioning only atoms in 7~. Then, of course, 
there is the question of computing the answer. As we have seen, there is no hope of 
efficiently answering such queries under implicit belief. On the other hand, using explicit 
belief, the corresponding procedure is trivial. Is the answer produced by this “quick- 
and-dirty” approach sound relative to implicit belief? Unfortunately, not quite. To see 
why, assume we use the reading of finding all prime implicates mentioning some part 
of the subject matter. Given A3 = {(rain > umbrella), (Train > umbrella)}, an 
explicit believer would then return both clauses when asked for information about rain, 
in contrast to an implicit believer who would return nothing. On the other hand, such 
“wrong” answers are not necessarily harmful, since these could eventually be eliminated 
if more reasoning power is employed, that is, if we move to a model of belief closer to 
implicit belief. Finding useful intermediate regular belief models with the right balance 
between inferential power and computational complexity remains an interesting open 
problem. 
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Apart from these considerations, a limiting feature of our investigations has been the 
restriction to a propositional language. Relevance becomes a lot more interesting in a 
first-order setting. For example, there are more possibilities to define a subject matter 
when the language allows us to talk about individuals and their relations. If we move 
to a multi-agent setting, then there is also the possibility to include the beliefs of other 
agents in a subject matter (see [23] for some results along these lines). We saw that 
our definition of relevance between a theory and a subject matter reduces to LR’s notion 
of forgetting in the case of implicit belief. Since LR’s definitions are first-order, their 
work seems to be a promising starting point for further investigations. Judging from 
LR’s experience, though, there may well be nasty surprises along the way. For example, 
the result of forgetting a predicate the LR way is not always first-order representable. 
Finally, just as weaker models of propositional belief have nice computational properties 
when it comes to computing relevance, the same may be true in the first-order case 
when considering models such as [ 241. 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank Adnan Darwiche, Adam Grove, Fangzhen Lin, and Ray Reiter for 
discussions which helped clarify many ideas presented in this paper. Thanks also to the 
anonymous referees whose suggestions have helped to improve the paper considerably. 
References 
[ I] A.R. Anderson and N.D. Belnap, Entailment, The Logic ofRelevance and Necessity (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, NJ, 1975). 
121 J.A. Blakeley, N. Cobum and PA. Larson, Updating derived relations: Detecting irrelevant and 
autonomously computable updates, ACM Trans. Database Systems 14 ( 1989) 369-400. 
[ 3 ] S. BuvaE, V. Buvai! and IA. Mason, Metamathematics of contexts, Fund. Inform. 23 ( 1995) 263-301. 
[4] R. Camap, Logical Foundations of Probability (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1950). 
151 F. Cuppens and R. Demolombe, How to recognize interesting topics to provide cooperative answering, 
Infiwm. Systems 14 (2) (1989). 
161 A. Darwiche, A logical notion of conditional independence, Artificial Intelligence 97 ( 1997) 45-82 
(this issue). 
[7] A. Darwiche and J. Pearl, Symbolic causal networks, in: Proceedings AAAI-94, Seattle, WA (AAAI 
Press, 1994) 238-244. 
[ 8 1 .I. de Kleer, An assumption-based TMS, Artificial Intelligence 28 (1986) 127-162. 
[9] R. Demolombe and A. Jones, Reasoning about topics: towards a formal theory, in: Proceedings AAAI 
Fall Symposium on Formalizing Context, AAAI Press, Tech. Rept. FS-95-02 (1995). 
] IO] W.F. Dowling and J.H. Gallier, Linear-time algorithms for testing satisfiability of propositional Horn 
formulae, J. Logic Programming 3 ( 1984) 267-284. 
[ 11 1 J.M. Dunn, Intuitive semantics for lst-degree entailments and coupled trees, Philosophical Sfudies 29 
(1976) 149-168. 
[ 12 ] C. Elkan, Independence of logic database queries and updates, in: Proceedings 9th ACM Symposium on 
Principles of Database Systems (PODS-90) ( 1990) 154-l 60. 
1131 R. Fagin, J.Y. Halpem and M.Y. Vardi, A nonstandard approach to the logical omniscience problem, 
Artificial Inrelligence 79 ( 1996) 203-240; preliminary version appeared in: Proceedings 3rd Conference 
on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge (TARK-III) (Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco, 
CA, 1990) 41-55. 
G. Lakemeyer/Artificial Intelligence 97 (1997) 137-167 167 
[ 141 H.N. Gabow, S.N. Maheshwari and L. Osterweil, On two problems in the generation of program test 
paths. IEEE Trans. Software Engineering 2 ( 1976) 227-23 I. 
[ IS 1 I? Glrdenfors, On the logic of relevance, Synthese 37 ( 1978) 351-367. 
[ 16 1 R. Greiner and M.R. Genesereth, What’s new? A semantic definition of novelty, in: Proceedings IJCAI- 
83, Karlsruhe, Germany (Morgan Kaufmann, Los Altos, CA, 1983) 450-454. 
1 I7 1 J.Y. Halpem and Y.O. Moses, A guide to completeness and complexity for modal logics of knowledge 
and belief, Artificial Intelligence 54 ( 1992) 3 19-379. 
1 18 ) J. Hintikka, Knowledge nnd Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions (Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, NY, 1962). 
[ 19 1 G.E. Hughes and M.J. Cresswell, An Introduction to Modal Logic (Methuen, London, 1968). 
I 201 J.M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (Macmillan, London, 1921). 
[ 2 1 ) S.A. Kripke, Semantical considerations on modal logic, Acta Philosophica Fennica I6 ( 1963) 83-94. 
[ 22 I G. Lakemeyer, All you ever wanted to know about Tweety, in: Proceedings 3rd International Conference 
on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR-92) (Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, 
CA, 1992) 639-648. 
[ 23 1 G. Lakemeyer, All they know about, in: Proceedings AAAf-93, Washington, DC (MIT Press, Cambridge, 
MA, 1993) 662-667. 
1241 G. Lakemeyer, Limited reasoning in first-order knowledge bases, Artificial Intelligence 7 I ( 1994) 2 I3- 
25.5. 
[ 25 1 G. Lakemeyer, A logical account of relevance, in: Proceedings IJCAI-95, Montreal, Que. (Morgan 
Kaufmann, Los Altos, CA, 1995) 853-859. 
1261 G. Lakemeyer and H.J. Levesque, A tractable knowledge representation service with full introspection, 
in: Proceedings 2nd Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, Asilomar, CA 
(1988) 145-159. 
I27 1 H.J. Levesque, A logic of implicit and explicit belief, Tech. Rept. No. 32, Fairchild Laboratory for AI 
Research, Palo Alto, CA ( 1984). 
[ 281 H.J. Levesque, Logic and the complexity of reasoning, J. Philosophical Logic 17 ( 1988) 355389. 
1291 H.J. Levesque, A knowledge-level account of abduction, Proceedings IJCAI-89, Detroit, MI ( 1989) 
1061-1067. 
( 301 A.Y. Levy, Irrelevance reasoning in knowledge based systems, Ph.D. Thesis, Stanford University, CA 
(1993). 
I31 I A.Y. Levy, R.E. Fikes and Y. Sagiv, A proof-theoretic approach to irrelevance: foundations and 
applications, in: Proceedings AAAI Fall Symposium on Relevance, New Orleans, LA ( 1994) 149-153. 
[ 32 I A.Y. Levy and Y. Sagiv, Queries independent of updates, in: Proceedings VDB-93 ( 1993) I7l- 18 1. 
I33 1 Fangzhen Lin and R. Reiter, Forget it!, in: Proceedings AAAI Fall Symposium on Relevance, New 
Orleans, LA (1994) 154-159. 
1341 l? Marquis, Novelty revisited, in: Proceedings 6th Internationul Symposium on Methodologies for 
Intelligent Systems (ISMIS-91). Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 542 (Springer, New York, 
1991) 550-559. 
I 35 I J. Pearl, Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks rrf Plausible Inference (Morgan 
I36 
137 
138 
Kaufmann, San Francisco, CA, 1988). 
R. Reiter, and J. de Kleer, Foundations of assumption-based truth maintenance systems: preliminary 
report, in: Proceedings AAAI-87, Seattle, WA ( 1987) 183-188. 
B. Selman and H.J. Levesque, Support set selection for abductive and default reasoning, Artificial 
Intelligence 82 ( 1996) 259-272; preliminary version appeared as: Abductive and default reasoning: a 
computational core, in: Proceedings AAAI-90, Boston, MA ( 1990) 343-348. 
D. Subramaniam and M.R. Genesereth, The relevance of irrelevance, in: Proceedings IJCAI-87, Milan, 
Italy (Morgan Kaufmann, Los Altos, CA, 1987) 416-422. 
